Il petrolio mette la retromarcia alla globalizzazione
La produzione di petrolio nel mondo è ferma a 85 milioni di barili al giorno. A dirlo non sono quei cattivoni dell’Energy Watch Group (vedi) ma BP (beyond/British Petroleum) nel nuovo Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, sempre citato per i dati storici su produzione/consumi/prezzi nei paesi del mondo.
Mbe?
C’è la conferma che la produzione ristagna e che il prezzo attuale non è dovuto a speculazione finanziaria o alle tensioni geopolitiche ma ad una offerta insufficiente a soddisfare la domanda (Bloomberg). Infatti il prezzo è salito di 2$/barile.
Non è la fine del petrolio, ma di quello a 10$/barile (vedi), un bel casino per i manager della globalizzazione a cui piace spostare merci, persone e molta immondizia in giro.
Certo, prezzo alto vuol dire che conviene ai texani tirare fuori i loro sgoccioli, ma anche che la produzione cinese raddoppia quando arriva in Europa o in California. Meno merci in giro. Tante cose inutili in meno in giro.
Finisce una grosso e vecchio trucco dell’economia: il valore aggiunto del muovere le cose, tutto andato (finora) a scapito del valore aggiunto del LAVORO.
Il pachino dalla Sicilia, le fragoline dalla Spagna, le arance tutto l’anno, le cipolle dalla Nuova Zelanda, costa sempre di più farle arrivare lucidateincellofanatesottoazoto sul bancone del supermercato sempreapertocoifrighiapalla. Per non parlare delle tonnellate d’acqua che viaggiano sui furgoni, invece che nei tubi!!
Ecco un articolo che parla della “localizzazione” possibile:
Why the oil price crisis is threatening to throw globalisation into reverse
Carl Mortished, World business briefing. The Times 11 giugno 2008
With brutal efficiency, the oil price is beginning to duff up a monster of the 20th century: globalisation. Those great tentacles that gripped our world in a hideous embrace are suddenly weakening and the multinational octopus is looking a bit pale and sickly. The extraordinary rise in the price of crude oil is wrecking outsourced business models everywhere and distance from your customer is no longer merely a matter of dull logistics. Whether you are selling coiled steel or cut flowers, the cost of transport is a problem. America’s steel industry is enjoying an unexpected revival, its competitive edge sharpened by the tariff wail erected by the cost of shipping heavy, low added-value products across the Pacific. We hear fewer complaints from Americans about Asian steel-dumping; instead, it is Asian exporters who are feeling the pinch and the pressure is from inputs as well as shipping to customers. China needs to import iron ore and coking coal, but the cost of shipping a tonne of ore from Brazil to China now exceeds $100, a cost that is equal to the value of the mineral itself The oil overhead for passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is proving to be a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations between some Australian iron ore mining companies and their Chinese steel mill customers. Antipodean miners are holding out for a higher price, arguing that some of the benefit of lower carriage costs belongs to producers. Proximity is suddenly more profitable and local solutions begin to look less like the expensive option. It would be rash to predict a revival of the Yorkshire textile mill and the demise of the Guangdong sweatshop, but you have to ask whether it makes sense to ship stuff from China when the price of a sea voyage from Shanghai represents half of the value of the product. The economics of long-distance supply chains are being rewritten; if it is small and expensive drugs and sophisticated electronics, for example fuel costs have little impact, but bulky goods are under the cosh. Furniture, footwear, basic machinery, building materials this is the stuff that China exports in vast quantities to America and it was very cheap, until now. Economists at CIBC World Markets reckon that globalisation might go into reverse if the escalation in fuel costs continues. The freight cost of importing goods into America represented an effective tariff of 3 per cent when the oil price was $20 per barrel in 2000; it is now more than 9 per cent and will rise to 11 per cent if oil hits $150, CIBC says. The revenge of localisation will be good for some but not for others and, just as globalisation had its victims, so will the gradual retreat by big business from the air and the high seas. The business of airfreighting perishable goods is going seriously awry. Most of the cut flowers sold in Britain come from East African and Latin American plantations. This trade has been a key target for climate change campaigners, who worry about so-called food miles and advocate local sourcing to reduce the carbon footprint of produce. British flower importers complain about 40 per cent increases in freight rates. In the case of carnations, a commodity product, the cost of airfreight from Kenya or Colombia now accounts for half of its value. Too bad, say the anti-globalisation brigade. Do without roses in January. Eat turnips, wear scratchy English tweeds, save the planet and blow a raspberry at global capitalism. Unfortunately, it will not work like that because without the benefit of cheap global trade, we will be at even greater risk of exploitation by big companies. Inexpensive fuel has made life in Britain very easy for the great majority, bringing with it not just cheap clothes and appliances from Asia but also very cheap food. The tariff wall of expensive marine and jet fuel will favour domestic manufacturers, but it will punish consumers, who will find themselves once again at the mercy of a reduced number of suppliers. These will expand their profit margins, comfortable in the knowledge that the overseas competitor is suffering a critical cost disadvantage. It is not clear that Britain will gain much from a localised world. A nation that depends heavily on trade is unlikely to profit when trading becomes more expensive. A more likely outcome than localisation will be regionalisation Asian, Latin American and African manufacturers will be forced to look to neighbouring markets for opportunities if the cost of long-haul markets becomes prohibitive. An expansion of regional trade would be good for the world as it might open opportunities for neighbours of giants, such as China and India to sell their wares. However, it may not be good for Britain, which has thrived on London’s role as a global trading mecca. It would not be illogical for trade in financial services to follow the regionalisation of trade in goods we may see more dispersal of financial markets to the Far East, the Middle East and, eventually, to Latin America and Africa. In such a world, where travel is expensive and financial capital more dispersed, Britain’s advantage might be more difficult to sell.
